“Other” Gendlin (1997)

“Each person is another life altogether” Eugene Gendlin (1997)

Welcoming you to add comments at the bottom of this page!

This page dwells on a Quote from Gene Gendlin sent to us by Rob Foxcroft:
Each person is another life altogether. Only thereby do I sense the other as ‘really’ other, as Levinas said.

The quote and its immediate surrounding text appear in a book and in an article (see notes coloured in green, brown, blue below). In each case, the quote and its surrounding text are followed by interesting diversions in black below.

  1.  Its use in a BOOK appears on pages 36-37:
    Gendlin, E. (1997). Language beyond postmodernism: Saying and thinking in Gendlin’s philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, pages 36- 37.
  2.  Its use in an ARTICLE begins around paragraph #24:
    Gendlin, E.T. (1997, November). On cultural crossing. Paper presented at the Conference on After Postmodernism, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL

A third related piece of interest follows:
Alterity and Asymmetry in Levinas’s Ethical Phenomenology
Randy Friedman
Binghamton University (SUNY)

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#1
Gendlin, E. (1997). Language beyond postmodernism: Saying and thinking in Gendlin’s philosophy. Evanston: Northwestern University Press
, pages 36- 37.
https://books.google.ca/books?id=gLCJM0D8ZDIC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Language+beyond+postmodernism&hl=en&sa=X&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=36&f=false

PAGE 36
If words were only discursive forms, then they could not say something new, nor something that does not follow from their established patterns. Then what words newly say has to be considered only a contradiction and a rupture. 

For example, Derrida criticizes Levinas’s first saying that the other person is “not just my other,” not just the other of me, not just other than me. The other is “other” in a more independent sense. Derrida understands that Levinas is saying more than “other” says as a discursive form, but he argues that Levinas has not established a mode of language in which “other” would not have to mean the other–of. Levinas has not established a motive language in which “other end of” would not have to mean the other–of. Levinas has not done that, but Derrida’s own metaphorzing constantly and deliberately exceeds the discursive form while overtly denying that this is possible.

To move past this we can cite Bordo’s call for “recognizing where everyone goes that the other’s perspective is fully realized, not a bit of exotic ‘difference’ to be incorporated within one’s own world… By sightseeing.” She is clear that resources are not all borrowed from the established language of the texts but “happen in the reading of the text.” I agree. Whenever we enter the experiencing of anything that is being talked about, we immediately find an intricacy with vast and obvious resources that go beyond the existing public language.

If we enter the intricacy we can establish the mode of language in which Levinas and Bordo are speaking: I can say that in my human relations I am often frustrated (and worse) because other people do not fit my needs. They do not fit me. I berate them for it, but I recognize that they are ‘other than‘ me. I see the difference clearly enough. It is easy to see that ‘the other person is not what would fit me‘. But only after a lot of living do I come to the deeper recognition that others do not live in terms of what does not fit me. They live in their own terms: of course, they are not what would fit me, but they are also not what does not fit me. Another person is not alive in terms of my issues, and does not consist of what is other than ‘me‘. Each person is another life altogether. Only thereby do I sense the other as ‘really’ other, as Levinas said.

As a discursive form, “other” has only one meaning, but in language-use, in the context of situations, we find at least two. But the distinction between them did not exist when I was only puzzled by my troubles with other people. I did not just find the distinction already there, nor did I just make it up. It has a very compelling but more-than-logical continuity with what was there before. It neither represents nor imposes. It carries forward how things were.

To say all this I dipped into the intricacy. From it I could speak in new ways. That can be done again and again.  It does not depend on the few poor discursive distinctions we have.  In our intricate situations
PAGE 37
the word “other” has many uses — right now — not only after we compare and differentiate them.

Words can say something from the more-than-discursive intricacy and thereby they can also say how they can. Both have been badly lacking.

There is no way to show abstractly (in discursive forms, in kept-same patterns . . . . . )  that “other” can mean anything other than “other than.”  But we can carry forward what Levinas said if we enter the intricacy of life with people.

Wittgenstein. Husserl, and Heidegger rejected the split between “outer” and “inner.”  They were critical of the scientific construction of reality from outside.

I have already mentioned how Wittgenstein speaks from living and acting in situations. Let me say a little more. Wittgenstein is often read as if he denied the existence of our obvious so-called “inner” experiences, for example, pains, images, and felt meanings as if philosophy should not concern itself with those. Even Malcolm read him this way, to Wittgenstein’s annoyance.  Of course, Wittgenstein did not deny those obvious events; he constantly appeals to them to show that they are more various and intricate than the simplistic packaged entities imputed by the grammar: “What gives the impression that we want to deny anything?” (PI, 305). “Why should I deny that there is an inner process? (PI, 306).  “ ‘Are you really a behaviourist in disguise? Aren’t you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?’ —  If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.” (PI, 307, his italics).

instead of these fictions. Wittgenstein appears to us to attend to what we find. He asks several thousand questions that begin with “What happens when we  . . .?”   He constantly asks us to refer directly,  to convince ourselves that the entities imputed by grammar are I what happens. What we find is ”more intricate” (verwickelter: PI, 182). 

For example, he shows that there is not a wordless meaning-object for a word to “refer” to.   Instead, he refers directly to the intricacy:

What happens when we make an effort, say in writing a letter, to find the right expression for our thoughts?  . . .  But cannot all sorts of things happen here?   I surrendered to a mood and the right expression comes.  Or a picture occurs to me and I try to describe it. Or an English expression occurs to me and I try to hit on the corresponding German one. Or I make a gesture, and I ask myself: What words correspond to this gesture? And so on. (PI, 335; his  italics).

Wittgenstein found the intricacy!  He asks us to attend directly to it, so that we can deny the simplistic schematic packages in favor of the intricacies which we do find.

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#2
Gendlin, E.T. (1997, November). On cultural crossing. Paper presented at the Conference on After Postmodernism, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL. From http://www.focusing.org/gendlin/docs/gol_2151.html  Quote is in the section copied below starting around paragraph #24:

 On “crossing” as a function of the body in language

If words were only discursive forms, then they could not say something new, nor something that does not follow from their established patterns. Then what words new say has to be considered only a contradiction and a rupture.

For example, Derrida criticizes Levinas for saying that the other person is “not just my other,” not just the other of me, not just other than me. The other is “other” in a more independent sense, Derrida understands that Levinas is saying more than “other” says as a discursive form, but he argues that Levinas has not established a mode of language in which “other” would not have to mean the other-of.  Levinas has not done that, but Derrida’s own metaphorizing constantly and deliberately exceeds the discursive forms while overtly denying that this is possible.

To move past this we can cite Bordo’s (287) call for “recognizing wherever one goes that the other’s perspective is fully realized, not a bit of exotic ‘difference’ to be incorporated within one’s own world… by sight-seeing.” She is clear that resources are not all borrowed from the established language of the texts but “happen in the reading of the text.” I agree. Whenever we enter the experiencing of anything that is being talked about, we immediately find an intricacy with vast and obvious resources that go beyond the existing public language.

If we enter the intricacy we can establish the mode of language in which Levinas and Bordo are speaking: I can say that in my human relations I am often frustrated (and worse) because other people do not fit my needs. They do not fit me. I berate them for it, but I recognize that they are other than me. I see the difference clearly enough. It is easy to see that the other person is not what would fit me. But only after a lot of living do I come to the deeper recognition that others do not live in terms of what does not fit me. They live in their own terms: Of course they are not what would fit me, but they are also not what does not fit me. Another person is not alive in terms of my issues, and does not consist of what is other-than me. Each person is another life altogether. Only thereby do I sense the other as “really” other, as Levinas said.

As a discursive form, “other” has only one meaning, but in language-use in the context of situations we find at least two. But the distinction between them did not exist when I was only puzzled by my troubles with other people. I did not just find the distinction already there, nor did I just make it up. It has a very compelling but more than logical continuity with what was there before. It neither represents nor imposes. It carries forward how things were.

To say all this I dipped into the intricacy. From it I could speak in new ways. That can be done again and again. It does not depend on the few poor discursive distinctions we have. In our intricate situations, the word “other” has many, many uses—right now—not only after we compare and differentiate them.

Words can say something from the more-than-discursive intricacy, and thereby they can also say how they can. Both have been badly lacking.

There is no way to show abstractly (in discursive forms, in kept-same patterns …..) that “other” can mean anything other than “other than.” But we can carry forward what Levinas said if we enter the intricacy of life with people.

 __________
Let me tell another story to go further into how the body functions in situations:

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
#3

And a related piece of interest:   Alterity and Asymmetry in Levinas’s Ethical Phenomenology  Levinas critiques both Husserl’s recognition of other people as like me, or alter ego … Intentionality is what makes up the very subjectivity of subjects. … life—that is, in the ego’s intentions, or my experiences of other people—to do anything … nothing that limits it, overflowing every limit, and thereby infinite” (Levinas 1969, 26).”

Alterity and Asymmetry in Levinas’s Ethical Phenomenology

Randy Friedman
Binghamton University (SUNY)

ABSTRACT: Levinas’s first forays in ethics may be read as extensions of his engagement with Husserlian phenomenology. Levinas rejects Husserl’s construction of alter ego, radicalizing it with his own alterity. Levinas similarly criticizes Martin Buber’s reciprocity as reductive and insists that intersubjectivity is always asymmetrical. Levinas’s application of his criticism of Husserl to Buber misconstrues Buber’s dialogical philosophy and misvalues the notions of alter ego and intersubjectivity in Husserl. Levinas runs into the problem of solipsism, which he mistakenly identifies early on in Husserl as he struggles with the privileging of the Other. In place of Buber’s relational subjectivity, we find in Levinas a form of the categorical imperative:

And the two walked on together. (Gen. 22:6, 8)

One should not try to dilute the meaning of the relation: relation is reciprocity. (Buber 1970, 58)

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Classes with Katarina in Kerrisdale

Kerrisdale Community Centre, Vancouver BC, Canada
9:15 am (one hour)
Free Introduction Monday, Jan 13, 2020
Ten Mondays Jan 20 to March 23, 2020

MOVE: Develop Skills to Move Through Unusual Circumstances
FOCUS: Focus on Options for Preparedness
PREPARE: Prepare for Everyday Life ~ Even Prepare for Earthquakes

IMPROVE your Tai Chi form and practice
WELCOME to beginners and those with experience
BALANCE and move easily throughout your daily activities

Click here for Tai Chi and Feldenkrais®
Click here for Move, Focus, Prepare

REGISTRATION ~ 3 options:
1/ Online
Free Introduction
Monday, Jan 13, 2020:
https://tinyurl.com/Free-Intro-Jan-13-2020
KCC #254315
Ten Mondays Jan 20 to March 23, 2020:
https://tinyurl.com/Class-Jan-20-Mar-23-2020
KCC #254316
2/ In Person: Kerrisdale Community Centre
5851 West Boulevard, Vancouver, BC, CA V6M 3W9
3/ Telephone:  604 257 8100 KCC #254315 / KCC #254316

Fridays  Feldenkrais® & Movement Intelligence
with Katarina Halm

Kerrisdale Community Centre, Vancouver BC, Canada
9:15 am (one hour)
Free Introduction Friday, January 10, 2020
Ten Fridays Jan 17 to March 20, 2020

Description: 
WHO WILL BENEFIT – Adults, seniors, caregivers & professionals
BALANCE – Learn to move easily throughout your daily activities
POSTURE – Improve your ability to sit, stand, and walk safely
COGNITION – Discover how the learning process enhances your conversations & studies

REGISTRATION  ~ 3 options:
1/ Online
Free Introduction Jan 10, 2020:
https://tinyurl.com/Free-Intro-Jan-10-2020
KCC #251861
Ten Fridays Jan 17 to March 20, 2020:
https://tinyurl.com/Class-Jan-17-Mar-20-2020
KCC#251862
2/ In Person: Kerrisdale Community Centre
5851 West Boulevard, Vancouver, BC, CA V6M 3W9
3/ Telephone:  604 257 8100 KCC #251861 / KCC#251862

* Certification hours Bones for Life™ teacher training
* Continuing Education credits for counsellors and movement professionals

CONTACT: Katarina at (604) 263-9123            katarina@thinkinginmovement.ca

The term Feldenkrais® is a registered service mark in Canada of the Feldenkrais Guild of North America (FGNA); Bones for Life™ is a registered trademark of Ruthy Alon, Movement Intelligence programs are the intellectual property of  Ruthy Alon.

The Master Moves by Moshe Feldenkrais ~ a developing discussion

The Master Moves by Moshe Feldenkrais
2nd Edition

“The Mann Ranch Workshop was open to the public and graduates were allowed to teach Awareness Through Movement. It was the sole ATM-only teacher training Moshe Feldenkrais ever taught. The workshop was recorded and later transcribed and published under the title The Master Moves. The IFF is delighted to have received the rights to re-publish this out-of-print classic and to support its translation into Spanish.” –– from the IFF   https://feldenkrais-method.org/materials/item/mann-ranch-workshop-collection/

More notes to follow.  Please enjoy adding to our thread!

Moments

Link to this post: Moments

The 20-Minute Break by Ernest Lawrence Rossi, PhD, with David Nimmons (1991) highlighted excerpts from Katarina

The Five-Stage Model of Adult Skill Acquisition Stuart E. Dreyfus University of California, Berkeley   

 

________________________________________DREYFUS APPEARS IN THESE PAGES________________________________________

3

Gendlin, E. (1987). A Philosophical Critique of the Concept of Narcissism: The Significance of the Awareness Movement.

Gendlin, E. (1987). A Philosophical Critique of the Concept of Narcissism: The Significance of the Awareness Movement. [PDF format available] Annotated notes below FROM https://www.focusing.org/gendlin/docs/gol_2158.html AND http://www.focusing.org/narcissism.html (contents links at the end of this page)   A Philosophical Critique of the Concept of Narcissism: The Significance of the Awareness Movement by Eugene T. Gendlin Chapter in D.M. Levin […]

4

A CHANGED GROUND FOR PRECISE COGNITION

A CHANGED GROUND FOR PRECISE COGNITION Eugene Gendlin University of Chicago In this article I will argue that there is an implicit kind of precision different from the logical but not unrelated. The two kinds have to be kept separate. The power of logical inference depends on the concepts’ own patterns and would be lost […]

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6136 A CHANGED GROUND FOR PRECISE COGNITION Eugene Gendlin

From   http://www.focusing.org/gendlin/pdf/gendlin_a_changed_ground_for_precise_cognition.pdf A CHANGED GROUND FOR PRECISE COGNITION Eugene Gendlin University of Chicago INTRODUCTION. ABSTRACT SECTION I. TWO KINDS OF PRECISION I-1) The “background” is implicit in the figure: I-5 Occurring into implying:   Six characteristics of implicit functioning: INTRODUCTION. ABSTRACT In this article I will argue that there is an implicit kind of […]

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Study page ~ ‘The Weber-Fechner-Henneman Movement Optimization Cycle’  (Russell 2017)

ABOUT ROGER RUSSELL:
“Roger Russell, M.A., PT, trained with Moshé Feldenkrais in San Francisco, Amherst, and Israel (1975 – 1982). A movement scientist, physical therapist, and Feldenkrais trainer, he is co-director of the Feldenkrais-Zentrum in Heidelberg, Germany. Since 1975, he has been intrigued by the network of ideas, including neuroscience, which stands behind the practical methods that Feldenkrais developed. He is one of the initiators of the Feldenkrais Science Network and a leading participant in the FGNA/FEFNA symposia Movement and the Development of Sense of Self (2004) and Embodying Neuroscience (2012). www.feldenkraiszentrum-hd.de/de/ ”

ARTICLE IN THE FELDENKRAIS JOURNAL 2017:
‘The Weber-Fechner-Henneman Movement Optimization Cycle’
by Roger Russell 2017 in The Feldenkrais® Journal!
https://www.feldenkraisguild.com/files/Journal_30.pdf
_____________________________________________________

SECTION HEADINGS:

Know-how and know-what

Muscle fibers and the Henneman size principle

Sensory feedback and the Weber-Fechner principle

The Coordination Cascade
1 The brain initiates and plans movements based on our self-image, and directs
2 the coordination cascade through the nervous system leading to
3 the spinal cord, where the Henneman size principle results in
4 specific (size-dependent) recruitment of muscle fibers which
5 enables optimal biomechanical organization of the ongoing
movement
6 including force optimization, smooth movements, and
reversibility of the movement pattern
7 which by way of the Weber-Fechner principle increases
the sensitivity of the proprioceptive feedback networks
8 clarifying the body image, and resulting in more efficient
plans for the next coordination cycle. Movement coordination improves as the Feldenkrais lesson unfolds.

_____________________________________________________

COPYRIGHT, FOOTNOTES, FIGURES:

© Copyright Roger Russell 2017 for all images. Art: Bettina Beiderwellen, Speyer, Germany. Coordination Cascade: Susanne Mertner, Nördlingen, Germany and Stefanie Ho , Saarland, Germany.

1 ER Kandel, JH Schwartz, TM Jessell, Principles
of Neural Science, 4th ed. (New York: McGraw- Hill, 2000), 419-428. The most comprehensive English-language source on Fechner is Michael Heidelberger, Nature from Within: Gustav Theodor Fechner and His Psychophysical Worldview, Cynthia Klohr, trans. (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2004). Heidelberger’s book also serves as an excellent introduction to Weber’s work.

2 Elwood Henneman, “Relation between size of neurons and their susceptibility to discharge,” Science 126 (1957), 1345-1347

3 Simon Blackburn, Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 123.

4 RS Reber, “Implicit Learning and Tacit Knowledge,” Journal of Experimental Psychology: General 118, no. 3 (1989), 219-235
5 LR Squire, D Berg, FE Bloom, S du Lac, A Ghosh, NC Spitzer, Fundamental Neuroscience, 4th ed. (Amsterdam: Academic Press–Elsevier, 2013), 616–651.

6 Moshe Feldenkrais, Body and Mature Behavior (Tel Aviv: Alef Publishers 1947/1988).

7 Kandel et al., 683–687.

Fig 1 Schematic diagram of a transected muscle showing the three muscle fiber types

Fig 2 Force and contraction time of:
T) Tonic slow fibers;
F-R) Fast-fatigue-resistant fibers;
F-F) Fast-fatigable fibers

Fig 3 Spinal alpha motor neurons and the three muscle fiber types—the size of spinal motor neuron cell bodies (triangles) matches the muscle fibers they enervate

Fig 4 Brain recruitment of spinal alpha motor neurons and muscle fibers—Elwood Henneman discovered that the size of the neuron cell body determines the order in which motor nerves and their muscle fibers are recruited

8 NA Bernstein, “On Dexterity and Its Development,” in ML Latash and MT Turvey, eds., Dexterity and Its Development (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1996); DA Winter, Biomechanics and motor control of human movement, 2nd ed. (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1990).
9 Elwood Henneman, EG Somjen, DO Carpenter, “Functional significance of cell size in spinal motoneurons,” Journal of Neurophysiology 28 (1965), 560-580; Elwood Henneman, EG Somjen, DO Carpenter, “Excitability and inhibitability of motoneurons of di erent size,” Journal of Neurophysiology 28 (1965), 599-620.

10 KV Kardong, Vertebrates: Comparative anatomy, function, evolution, 3rd ed. (Boston: McGraw Hill, 2002), 375.

11 FW Nutter, “Weber-Fechner Law,” Plant Pathology and Microbiology Publications 71 (2010), accessed online July 27, 2017, http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/ plantpath_pubs/7

Fig 5 Subjective experience and absolute stimulus value in the cases of pain, light, and weight

Fig 6 Relationship between force/ weight and just noticeable difference thresholds in different activities—the just noticeable difference (jnd) for muscle effort varies for strength training, endurance, and coordination exercises— using low force in Feldenkrais lessons allows us to sense smaller differences in our movements

Fig 7 Relationship between force/weight and information impact in different activities—turning the curve in Fig. 6 around shows that when force is reduced, the impact of feedback information for our coordination is higher than it is in strength and conditioning exercises done with more effort

Fig 8 The Coordination Cascade illustrates how Feldenkrais lessons refine the functioning of our nervous system—at every level

12 “Gregory Bateson,” http://www.informationphilosopher.com/solutions/scientists/ bateson/ (accessed July 27, 2017).

13 Roger Russell,Poster: The Coordination Cascade and the Feldenkrais Method, 2014, Feldenkraiszentrum- Heidelberg. This image is a top-down schematic representation of how movement experiments can be directed by the prefrontal system for exploratory fast learning. Multiple sources in neuroscience literature have served as background knowing what for this poster, which is available through the FGNA bookstore.

14 Squire et al., 616–651

Fig 9 The Weber-Fechner- Henneman Movement Optimization Cycle

15 Kandel et al., 661-663 and 726-730.

Pen and ink drawings of “Book on Foot” and “Dead Bird” Feldenkrais Awareness Through Movement lessons by Andrew Dawson, 2016′

_____________________________________________________

INFORMAL READING:

Below are links to informal recorded readings of Roger’s article and the references. (our usual password)
The Weber-Fechner-Henneman Movement Optimization Cycle by Roger Russell 2017 (K reading text)
https://www.dropbox.com/s/rfx395xnlum1y44
The Weber-Fechner-Henneman Movement Optimization Cycle by Roger Russell 2017 (K reading REFERENCES)
https://www.dropbox.com/s/6vz7u6cbf6u6pe8/

NEW! Fall 2018 Study in APM with Neil Dunaetz

Shall we sign up for Neil Dunaetz’s 1-Day 
Sunday October 7, 9am-11am New York 6am-8am Pacific  
For Beginners, Intermediate & Advance
Do you feel that those in your local Practice group may like to sign up too?
 
NEW! Fall 2018 Study in APM with Neil Dunaetz PDF of the courses offered by Neil

Neil’s Fall 2018 Study in Gendlin’s Process Model (as amended Sept. 6)

Annotated summary and Colours added by Katarina for reference when talking with those who might like to participate. You can click on one of these links to lead to Neil’s description.

Click for Writings by Neil Dunaetz


NEW! Fall 2018 Study in APM with Neil Dunaetz

Neil Dunaetz writes: “I offer the following for study in Gendlin’s main philosophical work A Process Model. Please let me know if you are interested in any of these. There is no fixed tuition—you can pay what you want. Meetings will be on Zoom (you can join by internet or phone). 

Thank-you & best wishes,

Neil Dunaetz
Email:  neilr@sonic.net
Phone:  707 478-6787
Skype:  neildunaetz”

1.
Gendlin’s Basic Philosophical Model,14-Week Intensive Course reading and discussing APM Chapters I through V-B.Our goal is to get a solid grounding in the basic concepts and relations. I will facilitate a close, honest reading–and discussion which stays close to the text. We will approach these early chapters as Gene intended them: as philosophical rupture and advance. There will be some additional reading outside of class.

Saturdays, September 15—December 15 2018. 12pm-2pm New York. 

Beginners, Intermediate & Advance

2.
APM Chapters VI and VII-A, 14-Week Course
In Chapters VI and VII-A Gendlin “applies” his basic model in order to think sharply about the first emergence of behavior, perception, feeling (consciousness), space, had objects, and symbolic process. We begin to see the model’s power to think about what before has seemed opaque and resistant to clear thinking. Very exciting!
Sundays, September 16—December 16. 12pm-2pm New York
Continuing Beginners, Intermediate and Advanced

3.
Pursuing Your APM Questions and Confusions
Let’s have one or two meetings specifically for working with your APM questions and confusions, and let’s do it in a model-instancing way where we relate the several questions within the model to let them “make sense” of each other. (Gendlin only did so much of this in his text; there are many more inherent relations to discover!)  So, get your questions and confusions ready. I’m very excited to try this!
Sunday October 7, 9am-11am New York
Beginners, Intermediate & Advanced.

4.
“Meshed,” “Implicit Functioning,” “Held,” and “Reconstituting,” 4-Week Study. We will see how Gendlin further explicates his basic model with these so-important Schematic Terms of APM VII-Ao.
Thursdays—October 11, 18, 25 & November 1.  3pm-5pm New York
Intermediate & Advanced

5.
Universals and Particulars in Gendlin’s Philosophy, 4-Week Study. Reading & discussing the derivation of kinds-as-such in Chapter VII and “the new ‘universality’” in VIII-A. Also, universality and particulars in “Monading” in the Appendix to VIII-A.
Days & times to be determined.
Intermediate & Advanced.

6.
Monads and Diafils, 4-Week Study. APM Appendix to VIII-A. Can we un-confuse ourselves about these two terms if we use earlier places in the text to think what Gendlin is saying here?
Days & times to be determined.
Intermediate & Advanced.

“Each philosophy in some way uniquely undercuts and re-positions extant terms. Eugene Gendlin’s philosophy of the implicit does this in a very noticeable way. A Process Model (Gendlin, 1997) cuts deeply, seemingly comprehensively, into the very ground of thinking, creating an effective new ground, a second alternative basis, from which anything might be differently and fruitfully thought, known, had, understood.

Gendlin’s model is understandable in what his concepts freshly do. A paper describing an experiential approach to reading Gendlin’s text is available. (Dunaetz, 2006) To understand Gendlin’s model one must directly engage the text, and more than once.” (Entire article)

 

 2. May 4, 2006 – FirstApplying:An Experiential Approach to Reading Gendlin’s A Process Model. By Neil Dunaetz

Because I work experientially with Gendlin’s A Process Model, I often cannot clearly distinguish what is Gendlin’s from what is mine.

Of course I could point to his text and say “that is his,” and point to my own words and say “these are mine.” But that would be a spectator’s distinction (en#1) where “saying” is only what has been said, just the finished “thing” or “fact” of it, standing alone in an empty space, apart from the intricate living process which the saying is from. Because I do not approach A Process Model as en#1, it would be false for me to draw the line in that way, even if, from another perspective, it might be valid to do so.

Though inherently unfinished, Gendlin’s text constitutes a unique whole in itself. As I work with A Process Model (aPM), what I have is something that in one way is like a hybrid (Gendlin’s-and-mine), and in another way, it is mine. But how then do I speak from my experience with the text, and within that speaking also maintain the singular integrity of Gendlin’s saying? I cannot. In my saying, Gendlin’s saying functions, but not as it would itself, as its own whole. For that, one needs his text.

When you want Gendlin, go to his text. My intention here is to help you have more of Gendlin’s meaning as you directly engage his words. (Entire article)

 

3.  Thinking emergence as interaffecting: approaching and contextualizing Eugene Gendlin’s Process Model  by Donata Schoeller and Neil Dunaetz

Abstract

Prior to A Process Model, Gendlin’s theoretical and practical work focused on the interfacing of bodily-felt meaningfulness and symbolization. In A Process Model, Gendlin does something much wider and more philosophically primary. The hermeneutic and pragmatist distinction between the concept of experience, on the one hand, and actual experiential process, on the other, becomes for Gendlin the methodological basis for a radical reconceptualization of the body. Wittgenstein’s formulation of “meaning” as “language-use in situations” is spelled out by Gendlin in embodied terms, yielding a profound new grasp of language, meaning, situation, language-use and culture as interactional body-process. Gendlin, in building his text, answers the pragmatist critique of a wrong progression of thinking where the results of an inquiry are read back to be its premises. With his central concept “eveving” (“everything interaffected by everything”) Gendlin shows how the seeming determinacy of preceding structure is opened in the actual occurring. He thereby elaborates a new conception of continuity where the possibility for responsive novelty is emergent in the event itself. The conceptual development of the text itself instances this kind of emergent novelty. We will somewhat follow Gendlin’s own path in using language-in-situations as entry-point into his more fundamental process-thinking, thereby asking ourselves how to engage his new kind of model. In the last part, we introduce some of the philosophical roots of Gendlin’s A Process Model. (Entire Article)

  

4.  A LIVING PROCESS: evolving notes on Eugene Gendlin’s ‘A Process Model’

THE GROWING NOTES
Contents
1 NOTES ON GENDLIN
2 NOTES ON THE TEXT
3 NOTES ON RELATED TEXTS

(Go to Website)

David Kaetz possible workshop date!

Dear Freinds,
We are conducting a survey to see if the date works. Please let us know if you are interested in the David Kaetz workshop and whether the dates listed below would work for you.
 
LISTENING WITH YOUR WHOLE BODY: testing a possible workshop date for September, 2018
 
WHERE Victoria, BC Canada
DATES possibly weekend of September 21 – 23, 2018 (Friday evening through Sunday)
VENUE   a church (to be announced once David has confirmed)
TIMES 
Friday possibly starting around 6 on
Saturday  possibly from 10 – 5
Sunday possibly afternoon from 1:30 to 4:30.
LODGINGS  (information may be provided once David has confirmed the dates and venue)
 
CONTACT us to indicate your interest.
MORE about David Kaetz ‘s workshop and book.
Gentle sturdy steps,
Katarina for David

Summary of Ellen’s Advanced Trainings 2019.

#1  British Columbia Canada: (Vernon is the town — Kelowna is the airport)

Dates: 2 days, May 11 & 12, 2019 (Saturday-Sunday)
Subject: Working with your Eyes and carriage of your head  2 days
Contact: Brent <brent@okanaganfeldenkrais.com>
The Okanagan Feldenkrais Centre
3005-32 Street, Vernon, BC, V1T 5M4
25 minutes north of the Kelowna International Airport.
Website:  www.okanaganfeldenkrais.com/


#2 Ann Arbor Michigan
 is the town — Detroit (DFW) is the airport.

Dates: 4 days, June 20 -23, 2019 (Thursday-Sunday)
Subject:  Ribs, breath, and your spine
Contact: Dale Jensen <djensen1@gmail.com>

#3 Washington, DC

 Dates: 2 days, Either August 24 & 25 OR August 31 & Sept. 1, 2019  (Saturday-Sunday)
Subject: Eyes part 2
Contact: Chrish Kresge <chrish@chrishkresge.com> or Jane Johnson <fitoverforty@jesed.com>

#4 Durham, North Carolina (Durham is the town — airport is Raleigh-Durham).

Dates: 4 days, Oct. 10 – 13, 2019 (Thursday-Sunday)
Subject:  The ribs transmit and connect movement
Contact: Marcia Eagle <meagle001@gmail.com>

NOTE:

Attendance is usually limited to 20-24 people.
Ellen seldom allows more than 12 Feldenkrais tables to be active during FI practice.

 

Go to Ellen’s contact information

Sleeping positions

With appreciation to Doug Bolston, this post is excerpted from “You can (and should) train yourself to sleep on your back.
Although it is commonly recommended that sleeping on your back is the best position to sleep in, comfort is key Most Americans sleep on their sides, according to the National Sleep Foundation. While many of them presumably do it without pain, this is not the best way to sleep. It can cause shoulder and hip pain, for one.
On top of that, several studies have shown that sleeping on your right side can aggravate heartburn. Scientists think that’s because lying in this position loosens your lower esophageal sphincter, the involuntary muscles that keep acid from rising up out of your stomach and into your throat. Sleeping on the left side, however, seems to keep the trap door between the throat and stomach shut, so leftie sleepers are less likely to feel the burn.
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How to nap

(with appreciation to Doug Bolston, adapted by Katarina)
Research has shown many benefits to naps—especially short ones. For example, over the course of a day, people’s ability to respond to stimuli—like an email from a coworker—naturally dwindles. A 2014 study in the journal Nature Neuroscience showed that people who took a 30-minute midday nap paused this decline in attention, and those who snoozed for 60 minutes actually reversed some of that day’s deterioration.

While everyone you know swears by a certain magic number (7 minutes! No, 17 minutes!), the National Sleep Foundation has this to say: “a short nap”—say, 20 minutes—“can help to improve mood, alertness and performance,” without side effects like grogginess.

Feeling really experimental? Try napping after drinking coffee. Several studies have shown that if you caffeinate before as short nap of 15 to 20 minutes, you’ll wake feeling even perkier than usual, because caffeine takes about 20 minutes to kick in. As Vox put it, “coffee naps are better than coffee or naps.”

Whatever you do, please do not try to replace your evening sleep with napping. While it has plenty of benefits, 20 minutes of shuteye in the afternoon is nothing like a good night’s rest.

Click here to read the entire article.

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